DRAFT
D R A F T
P e r s o n a l A c c o u n t
Multi-City CERT Drill
May 20, 2007, Greystone Mansion, Beverly Hills, Calif.
© 2007, Cliff Cheng, Ph.D., WW6CC
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
As a management consultant and former Organizational Behavior/Human Resource Management Professor, I find it useful for my own learning to analyze each emergency training drill in which I have had the opportunity to participate. Learning and improving requires one to identify what worked and what could have been done better. Real learning is not possible without an openness to correct errors and improve the next time. If one is really serious about preparedness, then a training drill is a safe space to try new skills, make errors, learn and improve so we will be better prepared if a real disaster takes place. What follows is a personal account that may or may not sync up with the recollections and experiences others may have had. They are free to state what they saw, how they interpreted it and write their own accounts.
On a pleasant spring Sunday morning on May 20, 2007, about 21 people from graduated the CERT programs in Beverly Hills, Culver City, West Hollywood and Los Angeles took part in a multi-city disaster drill organized by Beverly Hills High School student Nick Upchurch, KI6HCO. Nick organized the drill as an Eagle Scout project. He and Erik Meyer of Culver City CERT organized the drill.
Nick and Erik ambitiously set up a full-scale exercise. The drill featured a functional Incident Command System (ICS), that is, we CERTs ran the incident as if it were a disaster we came across. They also invited Culver City Amateur Radio Emergency Service (CCARES) and the LA County Sheriff's Disaster Communications Service (DCS) to come support the CERT teams with a communications link.
The drill took place on the grounds of Greystone Mansion, which originally belonged to the Doheny family and later became a Beverly Hills city park. It is located at 905 Loma Vista Drive, Beverly Hills, California, 90210 north of Sunset Blvd. Greystone is familiar the world over for it has been used over the years in thousands of movies, TV shows and TV commercials as a location.
The scenario was an earthquake (no magnitude or epicenter specified) while school children were on a field trip in the park. We were not given much instruction beyond this.
I. Who Came: Human Resources
There were 21 people from the four cities who participated. Nick said another 10 people had called to say they were coming but did not show. The drill was conceived as drill between Beverly Hills, West Hollywood and Culver City, which are in a mutual aid district together. As a volunteer Preparedness Ambassador in LA City, a leader in the neighborhoods adjacent to all three cities, and a CERT instructor, I was invited to come. I asked if I could invite other adjacent neighborhood leaders and CERT people. The condition of the invitation was that they be CERT members who are disaster service workers (DSW), in other words covered by workmen's compensation.
I wanted to include as many people from as many LA neighborhoods adjacent to Beverly Hills, West Hollywood and Culver City as I could. Unfortunately few neighborhood leaders met the criteria of being a DSW. There are few LAFD CERT graduates who are DSWs. In LAFD CERT a graduate means they have taken 7 out of the 8 FEMA CERT modules. Unless they go onto LAFD's yearly drill, which is counted as the 8th module, they do not become a DSW. They say they have less than 300 CERT volunteers, DSWs (for a city with 4M people). There probably are CERT graduates and perhaps even DSWs in our neighborhood but LAFD, citing "privacy" is not willing to tell neighborhood organizations who the CERT trained people are in their neighborhoods. So I could only invite people I know who are DSWs. This was a very short list. I did encourage other people in the adjacent neighborhoods to become a DSW before the Multi-City Drill. Three people did this.
It is not accurate to say we "represented LA." It was more accurate to say, those attending are leaders of LA neighborhoods and CERT people from LA who hold DSW ID cards. From LA the five people who are LA DSWs were: Marilyn Wall, Co-President of Sunset Square Neighborhood Assn.; Bruce Remick, President, Spaulding Square Neighborhood Assn.; Thalia Johnson, resident of South Robertson; and Neighborhood Preparedness Ambassadors Susan Silver, Tract 7260, and Cliff Cheng, Ph.D., WW6CC, President, Palms-Westside Village Neighborhood Watch, President, West of Fairfax Neighbors, and La Cresenta Valley (LA Sheriff's) CERT Instructor.
Marielen Martin is currently a LA resident but for the purposes of this drill is technically classified as a WeHo CERT where she was trained and holds DSW status.
Culver City fielded 5 people including its CERT President Perry Waldo; Dr. Mike Landau, MD, KG6FRL, as radio control operator; Dr. Loni Anderson, L.Ac., DOM, KG6VCI; Tracy Sulkin, KG6VCK; and Arturo (last name unknown).
Beverly Hills brought 6 people: Ken Novack (KG6EET), Howard, Sam, Sasson, Lynn and Mark (last names unknown). (There might have been another 2 unidentified people).
II. IC, Staff and Task
Usually under the Incident Command System (ICS), the first person on the scene is the Incident Commander (IC). A higher ranking person coming on-scene usually relieves the lower ranking person as IC. There may be cases in which a lower ranking person who is exceptionally qualified may be IC.
Since we were all at the drill at the beginning, the group selected the IC at the instruction of the drill organizer. Perry Waldow, President of Culver City CERT, was chosen as IC.
(Who gets selected as leader, particularly of a group of strangers is an interesting question. We find, particularly in the jury psychology literature, that in new groups individuals with the higher status outside the group tend to be selected group leader. And the group did select the person with the highest status, Perry.
Perry was the only CERT President there. Beverly Hills CERT amd LA City CERT are run by their Fire Depts. They have no "President." Also it seems, of the groups there, Culver City's people knew and worked with each more than the other cities. Group cohesion is very important in intragroup relations.
Before the drill, and just as nominations for President were occurring, I reminded the LA people that we are guests and to behave like cooperative supportive guests invited to a joint drill between Beverly Hills, WeHo and Culver City. I actually was concerned when we all arrived and it turned out the LA contingent was as large as the host cities' groups. I think good guests should not overwhelm their hosts.
Perry asked for volunteers. Dr. Loni Anderson, L.Ac., DOM, KG6VCI, volunteered to run Medical Operations (MedOps). I volunteered to help Perry - not knowing what I would be assigned to. I just knew I wanted to model for LA people that we are there to do what we can to help.
I was asked to serve as Staging Area Mgr. This was a job I had not done before. I am usually tasked with communications since I have been a licensed radio amateur involved in emergency communications since 1975. I was looking forward to becoming more rounded and gaining experience in something new.
The tasks ahead of the group were to: establish an incident command post (ICP), staging area, and medical treatment area (MedOps); perform search and rescue (SAR) and triage; transport victims to MedOps; treat; and await further transport.
The ICP was Culver City CERT's Command Vehicle which they brought up. This vehicle was set up in the public parking lot, at the top of the park grounds. A drill participant later asked - how come the ICP was not closer to the action. As we learned in CERT class, there are hot, warm and cold zones in relative proximity to a hazard. The ICP should not be in a zone which is unsafe. If the incident command post is lost, the response effort will likely stall and possibly fail.
III. ICS Framework
As IC, Perry had overall responsibility. He was the central hub for communications. All communications went to him and went out from him. He had to process the information and act accordingly.
Unless the IC delegates, then all the jobs are his/hers. ICS is modular; only use structure as need. Ideally ICS should not be thought of as a rigid military hierarchy; though it often works out to be this way. An ICS organization should change as the incident changes. The emphasis should be on flexibility and adaptability. An ICS organization expands and contracts as needed.
Perry "stood up" (created) a MedOps Unit Manager and Staging Area Manager. MedOps and Staging are in this usage part of Operations Section. It is not necessary under ICS to have section chiefs if they are unnecessary. The IC can create units from the bottom up and have them report directly to him/her; as Perry did in this case.
There were other jobs Perry could have staffed. There are standard Command Staff positions which would have reported directly to him/her: Safety Officer, Liaison Officer, Public Information Officer (PIO). There is also a General Staff which can consist of the Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration Section Chiefs. Some incidents may require a fifth section, Information and Intelligence. If this fifth section is not used, its functions are spread over operations and planning. This drill was not big enough for all this structure.
The section's main sub-units are Branches. Branches are led by a Branch Director and have geographical Divisions and/or functional Groups. Divisions and Groups are led by a Supervisor. Branches/Divisions are made-up of Units, Task Forces, Strike Teams, and single resources (individual people and equipment). Units, Tasks Forces and Strike Teams are led by someone with the title of Leader.
In our drill, Greystone Park could have been geographically divided into Divisions, e.g. north and south or east and west. If we had small fires, then we would have had a fire suppression group that would have put out fires no matter which geographical division of Greystone it occurred in.
The Staging Area is actually a part of Operations Section (Ops). With ICS, one can have a facility or unit that is at the bottom of the organizational chart and not have the intervening layers of hierarchical organization.
MedOps as constituted in this drill was an operational unit. In the standard ICS organizational chart there is a medical unit in the Logistics Sections. This unit is for treating injured incident personnel, not victims. We did not have a big enough incident to have one of those. In our drill, MedOps treated victims.
There also maybe a Deputy IC. The Deputy IC must be fully qualified to be an IC. Sometimes the Deputy IC becomes the IC in the next operational period (shift).
After the drill, I was asked by a new person, if it was realistic that a civilian volunteer would be IC? The premise of the CERT program is that professional responders are too overwhelmed to respond to our neighborhood's needs after a major disaster. In such a situation it is possible that a civilian volunteer would be the IC.
Another question was asked, who does the IC report to? In our drill, no one (except the drill organizer). However in an actual disaster, the IC is ultimately responsible to the government executive, e.g. city Mayor, or county Board of Supervisors. The executive bears ultimate responsibility. Typically the executive will have an Emergency Manager (EmMgr) who is their coordinator. There may be a Deputy Mayor or a Commissioner, or Department head that the EmMgr reports through to get to the executive. EmMgrs typically do not have command of responders and resources. Rather they coordinate amongst the agency heads who do have command.
As Staging Area Manager, my job was to establish a Staging Area, at the IC's direction, located in a safe location yet near the operational area. Of course, in some incidents, the size of the operational area may be an unknown at the beginning of the operation. And what may seem safe may later change. Moving the Staging Area is not unusual.
The Incident Command System (ICS), as can be recalled from CERT basic, is modular. One can use as much or as little as possible. The structure used in this incident was very simple. There was only one incident in one location.
The incident at hand was a single command as opposed to a unified command made up of several jurisdictions. The entire incident was handled by CERTs acting as a single agency. The fact that the CERTs were from 4 different cities was not important in this drill (though a future multi-city activation and notification drill would be useful). In the case of the LA people, most did not know one another. They came from different neighborhoods. The CERTs from different cities did not work as intact teams from that city. The CERTs were mixed in together and worked as one.
They had standardized training through the national CERT curriculum to make this possible; an national incident management system (NIMS) principle. At the level of a CERT, the integration and communication issues that people from different agencies and different disciplines within the 10 basic emergency responder classifications which the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security has set out is not an issue.
ICS uses the classical management theory concept of span of control. Under this notion, a supervisor should be supervising 3 to 7 people, 5 being optimal. Span of control uses delegation in and attempt to prevent bottlenecks and information overload. As we will discuss later, some participants were frustrated at the delay in getting orders. In this small an incident the IC was the immediate supervisor when people were not at Staging or MedOps. IC was supervising 19 people and two facilities. ICS would have had us increase the number of supervisors.
MedOps and Staging also served as their own radio operators. There was one Scribe in Staging. Staging needed a Scribe due to having to keep track of personnel. The rest of the people were operational responders who reported directly to IC.
In practice at this drill, there was one manager, the IC. There were two facility supervisors, MedOps and Staging which under the notion of span of control were not really managers of people. MedOps and Staging Managers ran a facility. CERTs doing SAR are suppose to be dispatched from Staging, find victims, triage and transport them to MedOps. CERTs are not suppose to stay at these facilities for very long. If one is at the Staging Area, one is suppose to be ready to deploy. Staging is not a rehab base. Therefore the Staging Manager is not really a "manager." The "Staging Manager" is more like a dispatcher. The MedOps Manager was more of a manager than the "Staging Manager" in that she had two people who worked there and they actually processed customers (victims). In this drill, to reduce IC's span of control, at least one SAR Manager could have been stood-up, or perhaps the park could have been divided geographically by division, each with a Supervisor.
IV. Individual Capabilities, Resources, Facilities
We have already discussed our human resources, 19 CERT trained people as a group. As individuals, we had three CERT instructors: Perry, Mike Landau and myself. We had one MD, Mike Landau, and one LAc, Loni Anderson, DOM (acupuncturist). Both Perry and I are Red Cross CPR/1st instructors as well. It is unknown if we had any others who had some sort of medical training. We will discuss ham radio operators in the next section. It is unknown what knowledge, skills and abilities the other 19 CERTs had.
As far as major equipment, we had Culver City's Command Vehicle. We had whatever equipment and supplies the 19 CERT members had with them. (I have always been concerned given that most CERTs are in their 50s and 60s, and put of shape, how much equipment can they realistically carry in their backpacks?). I did not see a medical equipment and supplies cache. We did have one scoop stretcher.
For facilities we had an ICP, a Staging Area and a Medical Treatment Area. In by-the-book ICS terms, people in Staging are supposed to be ready for assignment. In actual terms people did briefly rehabed (rehabilitation, i.e. rest, food) at Staging and MedOps. These functions are suppose to be carried out at a facility ICS calls a Base.
V. Amateur Radio
The shortage of licensed amateur radio operators was evident at the start. For 19 CERT members, we had 5 hams. Culver City brought: Dr. Mike Landau, MD, KG6FRL, as control operator; Tracy Sulkin, Culver City CERT, KG6VCK; and Dr. Loni Anderson, L.Ac., DOM, KG6VCI. Beverly Hills had one ham at the drill, Ken Novack, KG6EET. I, WW6CC, was the only ham from LA. West Hollywood had none. Since Loni and I both have amateur radio licenses, we did our primary job as well as that of radio operator.
Culver City CERT is very well-integrated with amateur radio emergency communications. They have about 90 CCARES members who support 450 CERT members (many CERTs in Culver City also have a ham license and radio). During their CERT course, they recruit CERTs to get a code-free Technician license. Both Beverly Hills and West Hollywood are part of DCS. CCARES is affiliated with DCS.
CCARES leadership in this drill made communications easy when the alternative is considered. Many CERT programs have done little to ensure their CERT teams can communicate amongst themselves let alone with the IC.
Back in the 1980s, I was a DCS member with tactical call sign J-31, out of the West Hollywood Sheriff's Station, DCS District 9. I am active in the Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES), the only national amateur radio emergency communications organization. Initially I was told since I was not in DCS or CCARES, that I could not participate with my ham radio. I did not bring my ham radio but instead brought GMRS/FRS, which two other people I invited were bringing. However, when we got there, we were told GMRS/FRS would not be used. I was, however, pressed into service even though I was not in DCS or CCARES. Dr. Mike Landau, MD, KG6FRL, loaned me his handheld. (Thanks Mike). He was the control operator so he operated the ICP's radio.
We had five radios. The main one was a mobile rig at the ICP. It was powered by either batteries or a generator. This resource was operational as long as the batteries or fuel lasted. The four other radios were handheld transceivers ("walkie talkies") which were useful so long as the batteries lasted.
The handhelds were distributed as follows: Loni had one at MedOps. I took Mike's to the Staging Area. Tracy Sulkin, Culver City CERT, KG6VCK, had one with SAR (Search & Rescue) Team 1. Ken Novack, KG6EET, from Beverly Hills CERT had one with SAR Team 3.
There were at times at least two to three other SAR teams which did not have radios. We did, in some cases, had to resort to using runners to relay messages.
We operated 2 meters FM on 144.33 simplex. There were no problems hearing everyone for we were in a small area. The Incident Command Post (ICP) was on the highest point of the incident operational area with a mobile rig with 50 watts talking to handheld units, most using a ¼ wave whip.
VI. Staffing, Staging Area Selection
We started the drill with a deployment briefing held in the public parking lot. We were told what our response area was and where to go check-in (at staging). A reporting time was not give. This was unfortunate since many people, as will be discussed self-deployed. People were not given job assignments at this point. They were to be given their assignment once everyone arrived at Staging and an inventory of what human resources we had was taken.
The two people who volunteered to work with Loni in MedOps went with her. The rest were to go to the yet-to-be-established Staging Area.
I had to ask a few people before I found someone willing to serve as Scribe. Despite having five ham radios, we were a low-tech operation. The Scribe was supposed to write down what happened, not just as an administrative-legal-historical record, but as a tool to keep track of personnel, resources, and assignments.
For the Staging Area, Perry selected West Court Yard, which is located on the west side of Greystone mansion. The MedOps was located on the other side of the mansion, by the Firehouse. There was an Inner Courtyard between MedOps and the Staging Area. We were told the mansion was off limits.
VII. En Route to Staging
There were about 12-15 people who started to go towards the Staging Area at the West Court Yard. Once we arrived, we were to set up the Staging Area. The IC and I did not know who the 12-15 individuals were. They had not checked in yet for we had no Staging Area to check them into. We did not know who and what human resources we had.
En route to the West Court Yard, one of the drill organizers told us we could not set up where the IC directed us to set up -- at the West Court Yard. I asked the IC to put out a call on the radio to have people standby until we located the Staging Area. The IC directed us to set up at the Formal Garden. A radio message was sent out accordingly.
Then, MedOps radioed that the Formal Garden was too far away from MedOps. This was true as we later discovered; there were also a few flights of stairs. MedOps also correctly stated only the inside of the mansion was off limits, not the area around the mansion.
The IC told us to continue to go to the West Court Yard. A correction was put on the air but it was too late. Confusion was created. People were uncertain where they were to report to for assignment. Some people left the group that was moving down towards the West Court Yard.
VIII. Self-Dispatching
Of the 12-15 individuals who went towards the Staging Area, almost all of them, except the Scribe and myself, self-dispatched. They went off and acted independently of the IC. In doing this, if these CERTs got themselves into legal trouble or injured, they may be individually liable and not covered by workman's compensation.
The West Court Yard was in the center of the park. Between the public parking lot where we started from and the West Court Yard were walkways, the (covered over) pool and formal gardens, and smaller structures. There were multiple victims down.
I asked people to report to Staging. They wanted to deal with the injured who were right before them. I said it was ok to quickly triage people, note their findings and location and report to staging so the IC could dispatch help. If I did not say this, they would have kept the treated people anyway and the whole incident response would probably have collapsed into anarchy right there on the walkway!
IX. "Not Tough Enough" and Volunteer Motivation
I later heard back that one individual thought Perry and I were "not tough enough" when people went "AWOL" (absent without leave). This person was referring to people self-dispatching. They thought Perry and I should have been more authoritarian.
It is probable that the victims were placed along the route the CERTs had to take to get to the logical choice for the Staging Area was intentionally. The drill organizers likely wanted to see if they would self-dispatch. They did.
At this point a management problem was presented to Perry and myself. We could have been authoritarian as our critic wanted. Or, we could, as Perry did, and I followed his example, remember we are dealing with civilian volunteers. For many of them, this was their first drill. They were taught multiple times during the CERT course that they should not self-dispatch. When one is inexperienced, one acts without thinking about one's training - which is probably what happened here.
The critic wanted us to publicly reprimand the individuals who self-dispatched. Publicly reprimanding a dozen or so people when there are only 19 or so total people in a volunteer group will have repercussions which will likely demotivate people from volunteering again. Having a militaristic or even a bureaucratic leadership style is inappropriate for a civilian volunteer setting.
The critic was imposing a military/paramilitary framework on CERT. Many people unfortunately do this. CERT is simultaneously a personal emergency preparedness training (PEP), a civilian volunteer preparedness team training, and organization of some sort. As an organization there are wide variances from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They can be very para-militaristic, and therefore limited in appeal to most civilian volunteers or they can be more participatory. Since CERT means different things to different people, the critic's insistence that their view is the one and only view would likely to have led to conflict and the demotivation of civilian volunteers.
Privately counseling those who self-dispatched would have been the generally accepted human resource management practice in this case. The counseling needs to be done by someone the subject respects. It would probably lead to further conflict if someone from one city reprimanded someone else from another city, not matter what the merits of the case were. Of course, there was no centralized authority from LA, just a collection of neighborhood leaders, most of whom do not know each other.
What the complainer does not realize or even disregards, is that there are key differences between running a military or paramilitary organization (fire or police department) and managing civilian volunteers. Civilian volunteers are unpaid and are donating their time. If you reprimand or otherwise punish them, even for good cause, there will be repercussions. Not only will they stop volunteering, they will likely criticize you to other volunteers who will be demotivated to participate. They may even take stronger action.
X. Triage Means Quick
In CERT class, people were taught that if a disaster occurs, and they do not have a 2-way radio to communicate with who ever is supposed to activate them, they should assemble at their pre-designated meeting place. While enroute to that place, they should write a log of problems they see, i.e. structural damage, fires, downed power lines and other hazards. It is reasonable to stop and triage victims. They ought to perform simple and quick airway management and to control the bleeding. The location of these victims should be noted. They also should we work on a buddy system. When they report in, help will be sent.
By quick I meant follow their CERT program's medical protocol. That protocol may differ from program to program. One city may have a standard of 15 seconds per victim to do triage. Another city may allow 30 seconds or some other time.
However, people did not do triage quickly. In some cases, as I was told later, they got into discussions or even disagreements. Many people had forgotten their triage training. Most people started transporting patients to MedOps without checking into Staging.
Some people got into discussions and diagnosis, which is clearly outside the scope of practice we must adhere to. Diagnosis is not within the scope of practice of CERT let alone a (medical) first responder (CERT 3), EMT or paramedic. CERTs have neither the training nor experience to make a medical diagnosis. There is a good chance they will not diagnose correctly and miss problems. It is safer for the victim if they stay within their scope of practice. We may not practice medicine without a license. People engaging in such behavior open themselves, the IC, and their CERT program to liability.
It is understandable that people who volunteer for CERT want to help victims. People helping people is certainly very commendable! It is what CERT is about. As positive as this behavior is, it is not CERT, Community Emergency Response Team. By definition, CERTs are supposed to work with other CERTs under ICS with a limited scope of practice, not as individuals taking individual action.
XI. Checking-in and Accountability
As Perry said on the air and in the debriefing, the IC must know where everyone is and what they are doing at all times; or in ICS terms, resources tracking is required at all times. The IC is responsible for their safety and the accomplishment of the mission. When an individual CERT person goes off on their own they "add to the confusion. They become part of the problem." He handled the issue of self-dispatching with tact. (Well done Perry!).
As Perry noted, the way the flow of personnel works in ICS is that people check in from their respective agencies (in this case, from the four cities). Typically an ICS Form 211, which we did not have, is used to check personnel in. At the Staging Area all people and resources must be accounted for. Personnel and resources need to be tracked. Emergency contact information on all personnel must be kept. Then that report is given to the IC.
The report to the IC has three statuses: assigned, available or out-of-service. Out-of-service means not ready. In the present case, our human resources were in neither of the three categories. They did not report in.
Checking in is a very busy time for the Scribe. As CERTs we are not paid. However our CERT agencies may be receiving some form of reimbursement from FEMA for the hours we worked. Our hours must be accounted for.
Just as checking in occurs, a demobilization plan is made. Plans are made to release people and resources.
The Staging Area is sort of like a police station; the teams are dispatched from there to go into the field and do search and rescue or whatever task. Then the IC knows how many people are available for assignment. Their progress in those assignments are tracked and the IC gets a situational status report (SitStat). After each task, they go back to the Staging Area for reassignment. Perry said at the debriefing he was scared when he learned I had no people in Staging for him to send out to do SAR. And there were people in MedOps before he dispatched anyone into the field!
One of the important consequences of self-dispatching was there was no field briefing. CERTs should learned what were their objectives, tasks, responsibilities, operation area, safety issue, emergency procedures, communications channels and protocols, who were their supervisors, co-workers and subordinates are, who will be in adjacent operational areas, how to obtain resources, equipment and supplies, how long their shift is.
Self-deployment meant there were no people available for assignment at the Staging Area. I had to wait for people to come back from Med-Ops and gather them. In-turn, the ICS could not be proactive. Instead we were reactive to information people brought us. Accordingly, the park was apparently never systematically searched! How do we know that we did not miss any victims? As a result of self-deployment, we had no human resources to get enable us to get our arms around the situation, to get handle on the overall incident.
An initial assessment is required to be proactive. The IC needs to learn are there any lives in immediate danger? In the CERT course when one is a first responder, one needs to conduct a scene size-up. As CERT teams conduct this size-up and report-in, the overall incident can be sized-up. The IC can not conduct an overall size-up without getting input information from the field. This did not happen due to self-deployment and a lack of radios.
It was not until later in the incident, for example, that we discovered Multiple-Casualty Incidents (MCI) in the white Beverly Hills Shuttle bus and at the stables. There was an unidentified transmission (presumably the organizers) telling us to search the stables. Had we been in proactive mode, this intervention would not have been necessary. Were there more individuals or even an MCI we did not discover for no systematic search was conducted? Did anyone's injuries worsen or did people die because of delayed response?
XII. Responder Safety: Buddy System, Communication
In CERT Basic, we learned that responder safety comes first. Not only did people self-deploy in this drill, some did so by themselves. Working with a CERT buddy is an essential part of safety -- which was a key lesson in CERT Basic. Always have a buddy. As inexperienced volunteers we tend not to see hazards to our own safety. Not only is working with a CERT buddy essential, so is making sure the IC knows where you are.
Lack of communications can be downright dangerous. Let us say the IC does not know where a particular team is and the team is searching a house that collapses. Let us also suppose that the team either does not have a radio or their radio is for whatever reason unusable. How could help be dispatched to the scene if the team/individual CERT person never checked in?
XIII. Waiting for Directions, Tough Choices
Just the Scribe and I arrived at the Staging Area, along with a few others who took off (self-deployed) before the IC dispatched them. Howard (BH CERT) and others said there were people dying while we waited for direction from Command. They were probably right. In a disaster very tough choices have to be made. A key CERT lesson is to - "Do the most good for the most people." We had the opportunity to field test this lesson at the drill.
Stopping at the first person one sees and focusing on that person may be great for the individual victim but does not take care of the largest number of people. Triage protocol is about quickly prioritizing all the victims. By not prioritizing, there is a high chance people who could have been easily saved were not. A quick prioritization is necessary because the presumption of CERT is that we will respond to multiple casualty incidents (MCI). As we would later find out, there our responses to the MCIs at the drill was greatly delayed because of an inability to proactively and quickly prioritize.
CERTs also had frustration about waiting for deployment instructions from the IC. There was one IC and one radio channel. We had to wait our turn to get on the air and get the IC's direction. More radio channels would not have been the solution for IC was managing 19 people. It is more likely that one radio channel prevent IC from getting more overloaded with information. As previously discussed, to reduce the bottleneck delegation would have been an appropriate intervention.
It is understandable CERTs were frustrated at waiting for instructions. They volunteered so they can help people. They were not getting to do this and became anxious.
Some CERTs blame "CERT bureaucracy." It would be more accurate to blame how ICS was implemented in a particular incident than use the term "CERT bureaucracy." ICS is highly centralized. It was started by the fire service which is a paramilitary. In this era in American history fewer people have had military service. They may even resent authority. ICS however uses the classical management concept of the chain of command. A militaristic application of the chain of command is out of step with present day society. If volunteers are taking part in the incident response, then rigid bureaucratic management concepts need to be adapted to civilian volunteers. If no adaptation is made, then inappropriate leadership styles and organizational cultures will drive volunteers away.
If one wants to be a CERT, then working together to respond to a disaster is what it is all about. As Perry later pointed out in the debriefing, it is a difficult lesson for an inexperienced CERT to develop discipline and patience to report in to the staging area for assignment or else risk becoming part of the problem. For CERT safety, it's essential to report in, get a partner and await proper equipment and key information.
XIV. Rashomon Effect, Managing Perceptions
We should note the contrast here between the comment that we were "not tough enough" and the complaints about "CERT bureaucracy." Which one was it? Were we weak managers? Or, were we too authoritarian? How can we have both complaints which are opposite of one another about behavior witnessed by all?
Social phenomena unfolds in time and space. There is objective behavior that almost everyone would agree on, e.g. There were no CERT members in the Staging Area at the start of the response phase. Much beyond this there are interpretations. One side said CERTs were AWOL due to weak leadership. Another side says the managers of the incident prevented them from doing their job - to rescue people. ...And, there possibly were other versions of "reality" who have not spoken and asserted themselves.
What we have here is the Rashomon Effect; named after Akira Kurosawa's Academy Award winning Best Foreign Picture - "Rashomon. " In this movie we see different versions of same incident.
An America adoption of the Rashomon Effect was done very well in the classic 1970s the TV show - "All in the Family." An important lesson in race relations was taught. Arch-conservative and racist Archie Bunker said the African-American plumbers' assistant was a Mao-Mao (radical rebel rouser) who threatened him with a switchblade knife. Another version of the incident came from Archie's son-in-law, liberal sociology doctoral student Mike Stivick. Mike said the plumber's assistant was step'in-n'-fetchin' (servile), whom Archie was oppressing because the assistant was black. Mike said the assistant did not have knife. We saw a third version in which the assistant was merely eating an apple with a pen knife and was not being disrespectful of Archie nor was Archie disrespectful of him. The lesson is that our "reality" is colored by a lens we may not be aware we have on.
As the various sides asserted their interpretations of "reality," at the drill, in Rashsomon, in All in the Family, to them their version is the only version. Anyone saying anything different was wrong; perhaps intentionally so. These assertions can only lead to conflict, even if they are made by the leader. A poor manager will make such an assertion, that their version of reality is correct and force their will on others. They may get away with this in the short term but repressive behavior will eventually lead to dysfunctions such as turnover, morale, disciplinary problems, poor quality, delays.... In a volunteer organization, repressive leadership quickly leads to previously discussed dysfunctions.
Managing the diversity of perceptions is a far wiser approach than authoritatively insisting that one's version of "reality" is the one and only version and everyone else is "wrong," "irrelevant," or "doesn't matter." Only by recognizing everyone has different interpretations and respecting different viewpoints can consensus and buy-in be achieved. Such as approach realizes that in CERT we have people who have military and/or bureaucratic backgrounds, along with people want democracy not just in their government but their volunteer activities as well. In a volunteer situation, one can only manage on the common ground people are willing to volunteer on.
Of course on an incident in which people are new to one another and there is a life-and-death emergency, the response has to be taken care of and then in the debrief and ongoing relationship, consensus can be forged.
XV. Staging Scribe's Log
The first Scribe seemed uncomfortable with the fast pace of the job and asked for reassignment. Susan Silver stepped up. (Thanks, Susan). Here are her notes. While some entries do not have the time or were not complete, Susan did a good job for someone who had not done this job before. I was learning and doing my job and wished I could have helped Susan more. These notes are better than many of the scribe's notes that I have seen.
In ICS a Daily Unit Log, form 214, is supposed to be kept. That log is supposed to have the major activities and personnel activities.
The Scribe has a key job requiring a high level of concentration and self-motivation. Some people incorrectly think a Scribe is a stenographer. The IC, manager, medic, or team leader needs a scribe so they may be freed up to concentrate on the immediate problem being presented.
If Scribes are unclear about any of the details that are happening, they need to ask questions. There is an ICS saying - "if it isn't documented, it did not happen." The Scribe's notes are a legal document. They are used so the jurisdiction can get reimbursement. They are used in case of investigations or legal actions.
Here are Susan's Scribe notes and my remarks in parenthesis:
1. Upon arrival at the Staging Area (about 10am), we found Joel, a man who has a missing son - Jacob. Jacob is 14, a Type 1 diabetic, wearing a brown shirt and cap. I (Staging Mgr.) asked for and got a radio call put out to find Jacob.
2. Kim Weaver came up to us as we were trying to get set up. Her children Casey 11, and Nichola, 17, were missing. They were last seen before the earthquake on the terrace. (She left before there was a break in radio traffic, so I could radio IC).
3. Someone (no name noted) made a report of one dead person (identity unknown) in the formal garden.
4. Howard (BH CERT) and Arturo (CC CERT) (last names unknown), came to the Staging Area to report a white City of Beverly Hills Shuttle bus with multi-victims on it. I radioed IC since Howard and Arturo had no radio. They were dispatched to do triage on the shuttle which was about 75 ft. from the Staging Area.
5. Sam (BH CERT) (last name unknown) was assigned as a runner since many teams lacked radios.
6. 10:24hrs. (the first time notation) Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.) and Marilyn Wall (LA, Sunset Sq.) passed through saying they were "going to assist "delayed" - going to med" (location and number of victims unknown).
7. "Thalia Johnson (LA, SoRo) and Ken Novack, KG6EET (BH CERT) taking Delayeds to MedOps" (How many delayeds? What were their names and medical conditions?).
8. 10:26hrs. Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.) and Marilyn Wall (LA, Sunset Sq.) brought Andi (last name unknown) to Staging. Andi's son Josh (last name unknown) was missing. I asked IC, and was granted, a radio bulletin to be on the look out for Josh.
9. 10:30hrs. Howard (BH CERT) found Josh (Andi's missing son). Howard triaged Josh as delayed. Howard brought the two of them to medical. (Josh's medical condition was unknown).
10. 10:30hrs. Lynn (BH CERT), "Thalia Johnson (LA, SoRo) and Ken Novack, KG6EET (BH CERT) return to Staging. IC formed them into "Search 2" and dispatched to SAR the garage and stables."
11. 10:31hr. Search 3, Howard (BH CERT) and Arturo (CC CERT) report the white City of Beverly Hills Shuttle bus has been cleared of victims. (Triage tally unknown).
12. 10:35hrs. Chris, a mother, apparently reported someone named John, 17, wearing jeans and a t-shirt was missing. She went alone to MedOps. (No last names for Chris and John noted).
13. 10:35hrs. Sam (BH CERT) and Marielen Martin (WeHo CERT) were assigned as runners by IC. They were tasked to bring water for the victims at MedOps, which they did and returned to Staging Area. (This was a brief appearance of the logistics function. Since this was a simple incident in a short time frame, minimal logistics were required).
14. Search 3 was assigned to search the northwest quadrant.
15. 10:45hrs. Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.) and Marilyn Wall (LA, Sunset Sq.) return to Staging "looking for a lighter stretcher." "Talking to Joel" (Who was doing this?). (There were complaints about the stretcher; that even without victims in them, it was too heavy).
16. 10:55hrs. A radio call came in that Joel's son Jacob might have been found. Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.) and Marilyn Wall (LA, Sunset Sq.) escort Jacob's father Joel to the pool.
17. 11:00hrs. Search 1 (Sam, BH CERT, Sasson, BH CERT, Mark, unknown) are formed by IC and sent to the stables. (There was no notation that Sam was assigned to Search 1).
18. 11:00hrs. Arturo and Howard, Search Team 3 - transported someone to MedOps.
19. 11:03hrs. Mother and male child pass near Staging en route to MedOps. (names unknown).
20. 11:03hrs. Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.), Marilyn Wall (LA, Sunset Sq.), Marielen Martin (WeHo/LA) and Amiad (spontaneous volunteer?) pass near Staging en route to MedOps with a boy.
21. 11:17hrs. Search 3 (Howard, BH CERT, Arturo, CC CERT, Bruce Remick, LA, Spaulding Sq.), pass near Staging with stretcher en route to Stables. (There was no notation that Bruce was assigned to Search 3. What happened to Marilyn Wall?)
22. 11:20hrs. IC orders Staging to relocate to Stables. (Susan and I walked down there from where we were at the center of the park to the southern tip of the park. The terrain was very hilly. My concern is for our CERT volunteers who tend to be at least in their 40s, with most in their 50s, and some older. This terrain was too steep, even with well-maintained park pathways and lawns for mostly out of shape people to carry victims up the hill by stretcher).
23. 11:25hrs. Staging arrives and starts setting up at stables. IC asks for count of personnel. We had 11: Ted (unknown), Lynn (BH CERT), Thalia Johnson (LA, SoRo) , Howard (BH CERT) and Arturo (CC CERT), Bruce Remick (LA, Spaulding Sq.), Sasson (BH CERT), Sam (BH CERT), Mark (unknown), Susan Silver (LA, Tract 7260), Cliff Cheng, WW6CC (LA, Fairfax, Palms).
(Medical transport had arrived to take the victims. It was too far and uphill to take the victims to MedOps by stretcher. Since most of the CERTs were in their 40s, 50s, and 60s, and out of shape, this was not a medically safe task for them.)
(Shortly thereafter the drill was ended. There was no notation of the end time.)
(There were 21 people pictured in the group photo. Lacking additional information, it can only be assumed that everyone who participated in the drill was in the photo. Two people in the photo, Nick Upchruch and Erik Mayer were drill organizers. The other 19 were presumably in the drill. All 5 of CC CERT personnel were accounted for and were wearing blue helmets and vests. All 5 LA people and 1 WeHo person were accounted for and were in darker green LAFD CERT helmets and vests. The remaining 8 were wearing BH CERT green, which is lighter and brighter than LAFD's. Of those 8, only 6 were mentioned in the Scribe Notes. This left 2 people, probably from BH CERT unmentioned. These two may be been the volunteers who worked in MedOps).
XVI. Demobilization
The end of an incident is suppose to conclude with demobilization. Our incident was small and did not have much of a demob. However an agency should have a demo procedures. All work assignments were suppose to be finished, along with applicable paperwork. Complete administrative matters. Check back in any equipment and unused supplies the incident issued one. Evaluate the job performance of your subordinates. Write a post-incident report. Do medical follow-ups. If one is demobilizing and another shift is coming on to replace one. Then brief the next shift, not just one's replacement but one's supervisor and subordinates as well. Avoid just leaving. Supply the next shift with your contact information in case they need to ask one questions. When one arrives home, notify whoever is tracking one that one is home.
Our drill only had one shift. If there was a second shift, then there would be an end of operational period briefing and a change of command to the new IC.
XVII. MedOps
From what information was available, the first MedOps Area treated about 25 people. No further information is available.
A second MedOps was set-up at the Stables. The terrain between the Stables and the first MedOps Area was too steep. Setting up a second MedOps at the Stables made sense. There was no further information available from the Stable MedOps.
XVIII. Triage Lesson Over-the-Air
At one point, one of the teams came across an MCI and apparently did not know what to do. They radioed the IC who gave them a refresher CERT triage lesson over the radio straight out of the CERT manual. With a small disaster such as this, this was do-able. It is likely most CERTs being out of practice will forget important lessons from CERT Basic training. The radio is a resource to get help; however, there may be higher priority traffic that is needed to use the frequency or the IC may need to do something more urgent. One does not always have direct medical control, such as Perry giving a triage lesson. What if one did not have a radio or could not get through to medical control on the radio?
Keep in mind that earlier we were waiting for instructions from the IC over our one radio frequency while others were standing by frustrated. They were not being instructed to go help people.
At the de-brief, it was notable that no one brought up the matter of first aid skills. At CERT drills this is a frequent comment that more first aid skills need to be developed. Clearly with people taking 5-10-15 minutes per victim to do triage and Perry having to give a triage lesson over the air, there is need for improvement in this area.
XIX. "I Need a Radio"
We had a very short debriefing, about five minutes or so. The problem of half to two-thirds of the SAR teams not having radios was discussed. Not having a radio could not only have endangered the SAR team but the victims as well. At the debriefing, the most frequent comment was - "I need to get a ham license and a radio."
The use of radio was new to most LAFD CERTs, who were not taught anything about 2-way radio in their CERT basic training. With the CERT classes which I produced under the sponsorship of the Neighborhood Emergency Radio Project, http://www.nerp.myeweb.net/ at multiple times during their CERT basic course, they were given handouts and links to the Neighborhood Emergency Radio Project. Our alums were exposed to the idea that communication in an emergency is a matter of life and death. This drill took them beyond an intellectual understanding and showed them the problem of not having communications in an emergency. (As an aside, Susan Silver, two weeks after the drill passed her code-free Technician amateur radio license and was granted the call sign KI6KFS. Congratulations Susan!)
XX. Dealing With Parents
Some of the participants remarked after the drill, that there were too many parents in the Staging Area who at times got in the way of efforts to stage personnel to respond to the disaster. Of course it is to be expected that parents were worried about their children and came to find them. A parent's protectiveness of their children is a primitive instinct that we ought to avoid crossing. We need to be compassionate and respectful of their concerns while performing our task.
One idea for next time would be to staff a Public Information Officer (PIO) job. Part of that person's responsibilities would have been to provide information to the parents of the missing children. The parents and relatives could be put in an area away from Staging, ICP and MedOps, or anywhere else there was response work being done.
XXI. Dealing With the Walking Wounded
After the drill, it was remarked that the walking wounded were a problem, that they were getting in the way. Apparently, they were Wandering Wounded trying to find MedOps. I wonder if all of them had been triaged, triaged correctly, and if triaged correctly, were they still a Minor?
Sending Minors (triage category) to MedOps in pairs or larger groups is a decision that should be undertaken with care. An MCI by definition is an incident in which there are likely not enough CERTs to send people escorted to MedOps. If it's daylight and there's favorable terrain with no hazards on the way to MedOps, the most Minor of the Minors can probably be given clear directions and can make it to MedOps without an escort. They should buddy up. However, someone may have been triaged as Minor but then in a while develop into a more serious category. If in self-transport mode, Minors may end up needing help.
What if the reported Walking Wounded who were wandering around were not triaged at all? Here again, the Wandering Wounded point to the problem of not having systematically searched the park. A sweep of the park would have found most, if not all, of the injured and triaged them.
People who have not been triaged and were Wandering Wounded, may not be in the Walking Wounded triage category. If they were confused and dazed, perhaps the level of consciousness warrants a more serious category.
XXII. Perimeter Control
The issue about parents in the way and to a lesser extent wandering wounded in the way, may be a perimeter-control problem. We did not have a perimeter established and controlled since we were in reactive mode and did not know what our human resources were. One thing to be grateful for is that the media did not show up. Without perimeter control and a PIO, any media could show up and start interviewing the injured and filming the dead.
XXIII. IAP, Incident Priorities
In speaking with people for whom this drill was their first or second, afterwards, we heard comments regarding how chaotic and confused things were. By definition, disasters are highly chaotic and there is a lot of confusion. The situation is unstable and changes constantly. There is a lack of information and communications. What information there is, is probably incomplete and inaccurate. Yet one must act, for time is critical. The incident response organization may rapidly expand. Those managing the incident, initially at least, lack experience. If someone volunteers to be a DSW, then they ought to expect chaos and confusion.
By following ICS we can produce more order out of the chaos. A question was asked, why ICS? We had people from four cities come together. We were able to integrate due to nationally standardized CERT training but we needed to follow the ICS model more closely. Management must be standardized. People who come in and out of the scene to help must be able to pick up on what is going on and then integrate appropriately. During a disaster is the wrong time to give people a new employee orientation.
Under ICS, there is a major emphasis on developing an Incident Action Plan [IAP] which states what the goals to be accomplished are during the operational period. When the next shift and next IC come on, they will develop their own IAP, building off of the previous one(s) with respect to the situation their shift finds. There are four key questions the IAP addresses: 1] What do we want to do? 2] Who is responsible for doing it? 2] How do we communicate with each other? 4] What is the procedure if someone is injured? ICS also uses the classical management technique of management by objectives (MBO) which focuses on setting and achieving measurable goals. Since we were in reactive mode, it was hard to be proactive and develop an IAP and communicate it, and to use MBO.
Incidents have three initial objectives, which are, in order: to save lives, to stabilize the incident, and to preserve property. Specifics on how these general priorities play out in a specific neighborhood for a specific neighborhood CERT team should be in the neighborhood emergency operations plan (EOP). The plan would address neighborhood specifics. For instance, the neighborhood organization sponsoring the CERT team should have a list of people with special needs, i.e. invalids, seniors, children, and pets. There may be facilities in the neighborhood which need checking on, possibly a perimeter around it the event of a disaster. These include facilities which have haz mat. They do not need to be an oil refinery to have haz mat. They maybe as ordinary as a gas station or dry cleaners. There may be facilities which are the kind looters target first, electronic and gun stores, groceries stores and gas stations.
What typically happens is that setting incident priorities are a process in time and space. We did not get beyond the life saving objective, for self-dispatching made the incident more unstable. We were starting to recover from this when the drill was ended. We never got to saving property. Our drill was confined to outdoor areas. There was not much property to save outdoors except the perimeters of buildings which we could have taped off and guarded from looters.
In a more proactive mode, we would have taken the three incident objectives and developed an IAP. The IC would determine the strategy to accomplish the objectives. On a larger incident where there was an Operations Section Chief, the Section Chief would determine what tactics would be used to achieve the strategy.
XXIV. Incident Type, Dealing With Ambiguity, IS100
The Greystone incident was a Type 4 Incident, the next to the most simple kind of incident. Type 4 Incidents are more intense than a Type 5. In a Type 4 the IC activates command staff and units as necessary. Type 4 incidents last only one operational period. There is no written IAP unless haz mat is involved. Incoming resources will get a briefing which will be documented.
A Type 5 would be a single car accident, traffic stop by the police, or single car fire. The incidents last one or a few hours. There are 6 or less personnel. The IC is the only command position. There is no written IAP. On the other hand, Hurricane Katrina or the 9-11 Attacks are Type 1.
Given that our drill was a smaller incident type, it is useful to relate this to peoples' reactions to ambiguous situations. People with a higher tolerance of ambiguity, which can be measured with personality questionnaires, tend to cope in these situations better than people who need a high degree of certainty. People of the latter category will likely find these drills and actual emergency responses frustrating. Such people are likely to be ineffective as emergency managers and first responders. Fluidity is essential in emergency response and management. However, if they still want to help, they might consider doing a supporting job. Not everyone has to do SAR, be an IC or Section Chief.
Some people use cognitive control to deal with ambiguity. One method of cognitive control is to be educated about the anxiety producing situation. It would be useful for all CERTs; not just the anxious ones, to take IS-100, Introduction to the Incident Command System. Eventually every disaster service worker, including volunteers such as CERTs will be required to take this course. This course is offered on-line for free. If one does not have a computer, one might try using one at the library.
Do a websearch for - IS100. Take the course on-line or download it and take it using hard copy. If you use hard copy you can either take the test on-line or request and wait for a Scantron answer sheet to be mailed to you. Fill it out, mail it in and wait for the result. The 25 test questions are laid out in the sequence they are taught. The questions for the most part are straight forward. Most people finish this course in an evening.
And, if a CERT wants to learn more - take IS200, IS700 and IS800.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I want to express my appreciation for Nick and Erik's staging of an ambitious drill. I appreciate the full ICS with radio communication drill they organized for us. In LA, the kinds of drills the Los Angeles Fire Dept. (LAFD) permits us to do are very limited. LAFD CERTs have been allowed only one role in a full-scale exercise, to play a victim (and that's after taking time off work and driving across town during the workday). If we are training for a disaster in which we are told, LAFD, LAPD and EMS are overwhelmed and can not respond to the needs in our respective neighborhoods, then we need to train in a more realistic manner such as the way Nick and Erik set things up for us.
The kind of drill Nick and Erik gave us is what we need. At LAFD drills, ICS functions in a peripheral manner. No CERT member is playing Incident Commander (IC). The rest are not even ICS staff officers. The drills LAFD lets us do tend to be broken down into stations where your team rotates, for example, to the fire suppression station while the other teams are at other stations. Most of time you are waiting for your turn to use the fire extinguisher or fire hose. At Greystone we had the chance to be put in a disaster situation and to run it. We are only as good as our training. We are all better because of this excellent exercise at Greystone that Nick and Erik gave us.
I would also like to express my appreciation for Perry. He had a tough job. He had people from four cities. Almost no one knew each across city lines. Even within the city groups no everyone knew each other. Many of the people who came were inexperienced. For some it was their first drill.
While it was a plus for Perry to have some many radios, not every team who needed one had one. Being IC means one is off somewhere where what comes over the radio is the sole source of information. With people self-dispatching, it meant not only was Perry still responsible for any problems they may get into or cause, the incident information they had was missing. One of the major differences between teaching organizational behavior to undergraduates who have little or no work experience, and teaching in-service executives, is that mature executives do not have the naïve idea that one has access to all important information when making managerial decisions. If one is going to be a general manager, especially an IC, one has to accept the fact the one will make decisions based on incomplete, inaccurate or even misleading information and then be held accountable for the outcome.
All in all, it was a successful exercise with people having a chance to practice their skills, especially using ICS and radios, and most importantly, working together across our common city lines. Thank you Nick Upchurch, Erik Mayer, CC CERT, Capt. Greg Barton, BHFD, Perry Waldow and all the people who played victim.
Let us move forward together cooperating as neighbors and neighboring cities. Let us start by learning how we can do better from what we have already done. Let us affirm the basic CERT value of neighbors helping neighbors and apply that to neighboring cities.
Cliff Cheng, Ph.D., WW6CC
Los Angeles, California, USA
July 2007
D R A F T
© 2007, Cliff Cheng, Ph.D., ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
DRAFT
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
